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CHAPTER I
BAOKGROOID

During the Revolutionary War, our original thirteen states

had the oommon bonds of ardent patriotism, and a foreign en..,. to
give them a semblanoe ot unit,..

Aa .oon as the muskets 8top.,4

their deadly ohatter, and the bar.s.ed red-ooat. retired to their
Island acr081 the sea, thea.. common bonda vanished.

W1th imminent

danger ot I'ational destruction no longer confronting them. tlw
States turnf'd to petty quarrels a..'11ong theuel.ve •• 1
!be American stat.a, immediatel,. after

th~

100s.1'1 bound by the Articles of Oontederation.

War, were .till
When the War MY-

aged the .ea-eo.st, these Articles aeemed to luffine); once the War

we.kn6 •••• became apparent_ Bot
,only did the viotoriaua Amerl~ans tear monareh7, itselt,! but m&n7

was terminated, their

1nr~rent

.sehawed any aOT.reign power that even reminded them of monarolq.
With such tear of strong government prevalent in all the State.,
it 18 understandable that the

~xecutlve

power should be, at beat,

Ii

lAl.Xis de Tocqueville, Democracl in Am.erlo& (New York, 1945)~
I, p,. U,).
2Breck1nrldgeLong, Gene.llS of the Oonstitution at' the 'O'n1te4
State • .9! W r1eJ., (Jew Torti, 112~T; p. ~,.
- 1

2

almost impotent un del' the ArM.oles.

This .fear of monarohy was re-

sponsible for the many exeoutive oommittees. 3
Since no power of taxation was granted to the

f:~vernrnent,

was foroed to request funds from the States.

GrGSS

Oon-

The dereliction

of the states, in their refusal to contribute to the government,
lef't the central government on the verge of bankruptoy.

Under the

Artioles, the States seemed more oonsoious of this freedom, than
of' their obligation to the inohoate Nation as a whole. LtThe States oonsidered themselves sovereign.
l~ovided

1J.be Articles

for extradition, a praotioe that was usual between sover-

elgn Nations.

Moreover, the oentral government was forced to rely

on the States for revenue, and the enforcing of rights, titles,
and interests in State Courts.

Unf'ortunately, for the government,

the States failed to send suffioient revenue, while In their state
Courts, they reoognized only suoh
speotive States.

la,~~ as·

obtained in their re-

"

With suoh handioaps, the National government was unable to
oonduot a vigorous foreign policy, or even to oommand the respect
of observant EU'l'opean Ifations.

Ii'ore1gn Countries 1'el t no assur-

ance whatever that the States would fulfill the G.groeeroonts made by

the oentral govermnent.

Ho foreign Country relishes treaties Vii th

a. Nation, whose component parts ignored their oblIgations under the

3Ibld •
h

212-213.

"Andrew C. !i:oLaughlin, A Constitutional History
states (New Yorl!, 1935), pp. -l39-1Ii.l.
..

2f !h!! United

.3
r'

IJ:'reaty of 178.3.~'

Until the Artioles were disoarded in 1787, Eng-

land lived in the hope of regaining all she had lost 1n the War.

At one time, it appeared that England's hopes were not in vain.

As Professor MoLaughlin notes, it seemed that the states, onoe the
fl~htinG

was over, could not reoonoile themselves to their mutual

inter-dependenoe.

As the days went by. "disorganization rather

tmn integ:ration,tt seemed to gather head-way, so that l'aen like
JI

C-eorge Viashington, and James Madi$On, te~ed i'oI' the1!' Country. t)

Sound otttTenoy was unavailable.

Rhode Island flooded the

Country with worthless paper, while states enaoted laws foroing
their oitizens to aocept pe.yment 1n wOI'thless tender.
Under the Artioles, the Legisle. ture was further hampered by
the provision that nine States must cast an affirmative vote to
pass an Aot.

This stipulation made it possible for the sumll

states to blook any legislation they
terests. 7

~deem.ed

An absent state voted negatively.

oontrary to their in-

Amendment of the

manifold flaws in the government was impossible, sinoe oonsent or
all states was requisite for an Amendment.

Pressure exerted by

the delegates to the Annapolis ConventIon, for another gathering

at Philadelphia, coerced Congress to aoquiesoe in the :::onstitu...
tional Convention.

5Alfred H. Kelly, and Winfred A. Harbison, The Amerioan
Constitution (New York, 19h8), pp. 106, 108-109.,

6MoLaughlin, p. 138.
7~.

140-141.

1,_

While ConGress strove to mould the states into a powerful
}Ta tion,

C~orge

As early as 1783,

tion.

of

American leaders expressed concern over the dismal 8i tua-

rua

Country.

Washington feared for the future

He desired sweeping Amendments in the Articles,

or even a new Cons ti tution.

He found Congress inept, and the

Q

states woefUlly selfish. u

In 1786, Was h:tneton urged tba t adequa te powers be given to
congress for the good of' the whole l1a tion.

Those s tanding in the

\Vay of strengtb&n1ng the National government, were either ignorant
or designing. <)

Althou€')l he wished to remain aloof from the "sea

of troubles," it seems that Washington realized action could and
would be taken.

He could nnot oonoeive" how the United states

oould surviva wi thout sonte Federal power the. t would. pervade the
wbole Union with an authority like that ot the individual sta.te
governments over their citisens. lO
,

Joh.''l Jay

WE'O ttl

to Gouverneur Morris, expressing his fears tor

the national welfare:

ion

0:('

ttThe present ministry are duped by an opin-

our not hs..ving union and energy- to retaliate their restrio ...
No tim.a is to be lost 1n raising and maintaining the Con-

tions.

federacyas to all general purposes •••• In

Q

ducive to Union and Constitutional energy

sl~uld

n

word, everything conbe cultivated,

'-'Carl Van Doren, ThfJ Great Rehearsal (New York, 1948), p. 6.
9 Ibid •

-

,....
oherished, and proteoted. nll
No one, save I;Iadlson, realized the weaknesses of the government, and the need for a powerful National authority more acutely
than did Alexander Hamil ton, of New York.

ffThere is hardly a oan, t

he said, "who will not aclrnow1edge the Confederation unequal to a

v1gorous proseoution of the War, or to the preservation of the
Union in peaoe.
weaker. n12

The Federal government ..... will oontinually gttow

Hamilton adamantly insisted on the need of stron!!, government.
lf1rhe separate exertions of the states will never suf1'ice.

Nothing

but a well-proportioned exertion of the resouroes for the whole,
under the direotion of a Common Counoil, with powelt suf'fieient to

give e£1'1oaoy, can preserve us from belng a oonquered people."

In

a letter to another 1'1nan01&r, Robert Morris, Hamil ton uses typically strong language.

He proposed ":~ Convention of all the

states, with full power to alter and

e.~end,

finally and irrevooa-

bly, the present futile and senseless Confederation. n13
In 1781, William Barton wrote a vigorous pamphlet, in which
he insis ted that Congress should ltnot be left with the mere shadow

of sovereign authority, without the right of exaoting obedienoe to
their Ordlnances, and destitute of the means of exeouting their

llGeorge Banoroft, H1.torl2f.2 Constitut1on O~ew York,
1885), I, p.
12Ib1d •

64.

-

13 Ib1d •

32.

....
6
resolves. nIl."
Jal1:1es Madison, of Virginia, perhaps more clearly than all the
o th.ars, realized and Imnented tbe weakness of the Artioles'"

Like

Har.111ton, he devoted himself to the cause of strengthening the

goverru~ent.15
ed,

~,ladison

Indeed, from the moment the Articles were proclaim-

foresaw the inevi table friction that Vlould harass both

state and National governments.

As early as illarch, 1781, young

,Tames Madison addressed Congress, man1fes ting his l!een perception
of the latent f'laws in the Articles:

nThe Artioles of' Confedera-

tion, which declare that every State shall abide by the determinations of

Cont~ess,

imply a general power vasted in Congress to

enforce them, to ca:rry them into ef"f'ect.

The United States in

Congress assembled, being desirous, as far as possible, to cement
and invigorate the F'ederal Union, recommend to the Legisla.ture of

ewry State, to give authority tn

emp~o'Y

the force of' the United
•
States, as well by sea as by land, to ~ompe1 the States to f'ul:rill

their Federal engagements. n16
After the War, !,'iadison also deplored another dereot in the
government, namely, that of' loyalty to the State, taldng preoed-

ll\.I!2.!!:! • 2l~ ..

15From his knowledge of history and political soience, Madison
saw the problems that would arise. Hamil ton was ever anxious to
model the new government on the EnGlish monarcJ:"l...y. Thus, Hanilton
VIas a little out of step with others who vllshed a stroneer gov ...
ernn16nt, but more along Republican 11nes.
16Baneroft, p. 23.

7
ence over loyalty to the Nation.

In January, 1783, he and a fu-

ttU"e ally at the Convention, the talented James Wilson .. of Penn-

sylvania, asl:ced batt$r cooperation from the States on Congroessional r$quests :ror finances.

He and

Wilson deolared that loyalty to

the Nation superseded loyalty to States and oonsti tuents.

Ang;ry

at Vixaginia t s fa! lure to sb.al'-e his sentiments, ?1adison firmly expressed his own oonviotions and adnronlahed his colleagues and

their Legislatures. l7
As the Counwy staggered into the depths of disuni ty, Madison
Washington, Hamilton, and others, saw the necessity
tion, that WOUld, at least, amend the Articles.

1'01"

a Conven-

M"ad1son frequent-

ly reported to the former Commander 1n Chief. now in temporary re-

tirement at his beloved Mount Vernon.

Both :reared that Congress

would balk at any attempt to amend the Artioles, and forge a
tlchain of iron. It

Madison wrote Wash:togton, f'r'om New York:

"Con-

•

grass haa been much d1v1ded •••• On one ,slde, it bas been urged that

some of the backward states have scruples against acoeding to it
without some Constitutional sanction; on the other, that some
states will consider any interferenoe of Congress as prooeeding

from the same views whioh have hitherto aroused
i es.

tl~ir

jealous-

n18

Madison was prudent in his oampaign for a radical change in

l7~.

32.

lBJamos Madison, Letters (New York:, 1884), I, p. 277.

8
the American government.

He counseled Hamilton, and others, who

strained at the leash to move slowly, lest their chances be scuttled by aroused reactionaries.

Although Madison lamented the

petty trade wars aml'lg the S ta tes J the jealousy of S ta te ,g;overn-

ments, and the paper money systems that deluged the land with low
value green-baoks, he cautiously awaited favorable ocoasions to
stress govaromen tal revision.

Ask for little when there was littl«

chance of obtaining eVen tha t, seek more as the sense of disaster
begins to grow, and as the pace of National anarohy surpasses the
feeble remedies acquiesoed in, others, too, will see the light,19

Patiently, Madison fostered sentiment f'or a radioal change in
the govert'll'nBu t.

l?irst, he worked for a simple pOller of' Congress

to tax imports.

De.feated in that, he sought general Congressional

oontrol over commeroe, next to seoure Virginia's call for the
Annapolis Convention, and, finally t ¥>,ssek another Convention
vlith broader objectives than those of

~llnapolis.

"

When Shay's re-

bellion jolted even the Conservatives out of their oomplaoency,
Madison was ready for the bold course proposed to \Vash1ngton. 20
By 1786, it seemed to Et~opeans, and many Amerioans, that the

United states was a failure, destined to prove once and for all
that Republican government was only a dream.

Washington fretted

at Mount Vernon, fearing that the Country he loved, and .for whioh

(1Jew

19 Irving Brant, James Madison Pather of the Consti tutton
2
-,
Yorlc, 195o), p. 1..).
20 Ibid • 16.

9
he Imd devoted the best years of his life, was slowly strangling

itself.

The National Treasury was utterly empty, and the states

were engaged in petty trade wars.

Deoentralization had been

aohieved wh..en the Colonios broke from the Empire.

now 1 twas neo-

essary to draft a Constitution that would entitle the central gov-

ernment to suppress internal rebellions, to regulate trade, and to
control the actions or the various state govex't'lIl'2nts.
Congress, still deftly avoiding a Convent1on, again attempted
Amendment oi' the Articles of Confederation, appointing a. "Gl'andCornm.ittee lt to report such reoommendations as they thought neC0Ssary_

This Committee recormnended only tbs.t Congress be given

power to regulate commerce, and to colleot duties on imports.

Sanotions would be imposed on States, default1ng in paying their
reqUisitions promptly.

Congress, however, was so moribund at the

time, that no action was taken on

~~,prop08als.

.,

Inexorably, Madison, and othors It s·teered the Country toward
the Philadelphia Convention.

In 1785, Vil'g1nia and Maryland had

sigtl!)d an amiaable agreement, settli:lg their perennial disputes
ovel' oontrol of the Potomao.

So much did this 1nteI'-state agee-

mon'c please the two states, that another oommercial gathering was
called, this time inoluding Pennsylvania and Delaware.

Then,

Virginia suggested that the other states be invited too, llnd that

the Convention consider

til

oommon inter-state policy.

'l'he .fanous Annapolis Convention met at Annapolis, l:laryland,

septelnber, 1786.

Although but seven states attended, Vi:adlson and

10

Hamilton used the meet1ng as a spring-board for calling a new Convention.

Hnmiltonts now famous words bespoke the purpose of the

proposed Convention:

ltto devise such further provisions as shall

appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Foedera1 J~liaJ Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union. n 21

Hamilton's words could be taken to mean a revision of the Articles
of Confederation, although it is doubtful if the New Yorker ever
hoped for less than a new Constitution.
Congress reared that the meeting would further weaken the
government.

nevertheless, in l'4o"vember, 1786, Vil"ginia boldly

adopted a l"8solution, calling upon the other states to send delegates to Philadelphia.

By Febtttlal"y,

:fOUl'

states

:bs.d

responded, so

that a diffident Congress, peroeiving the inevitable, saved faoe
with a s1m!l&!" recommendation for a Convention.
f:~tates,

Soon all the

obdurate Rhode Island alone l'!3fra1ning, had elected dele-

gates to amend the Articles.
With this stamp of Congt'essional approva.l upon the Convention,
the dream of Madison, Washington, and Hamilton, was fulfilled.
James Madison was the first delegate to arrive at the City of

Brotherly Love, the 1b llowlng May.

This vtas only us. t;ural in the

man who had so ardently desired this gathering, and hoped to pre ...
sent a plan embodying his ideas on the new Cons ti tu tion.

As the

other delegates tl"iokled into the C1 ty, Madison, and the Virginia
21

Van DOl"en, p. 7.

11
group labored over the Virginia Plan, which in large part, would
22
emerge as ol.l.I'.fin1shed Gons ti tution.
Besides Madison, fifty.five other delegates participated in
the gathering at Philadelphia.

Of these fifty-five, tIm major

part of the drafting was done by a dozen men.
Hadison was foremos t.

A

O.f this dozen,

mediocre speaker, and of almost colorless

appearance, he possessed a keen mind, and a wealth of scholarly
erudition.

He has been oalled the f'Father of the Conati tution ft

because of the dominant role he played in forging a strong Hation ...
al government, with authority not from thirteen testy sovereign ..

ties, but .from the people of Ame~ica.23
central

govern~~nt

This idea of a strong

resting not on tl» States, but on the people of

the land, was the conviction for whioh Iladison fought throughout

the Convention.
lJ.lle Consti tution of the Un! ted

ilar dooument known to history.

~tates

has outlasted any sim-

This 1fJame Constitution suooeeded,

where the Articles of Confederation failed booause it established

strong National government, founded on the Amerioan people.
the men who

contrlbu~d

to the Philadelphia Convention, one alone

deswves the title of rtPather
this reason

tm t

Of all

o~

the Constitutlon. lt

It is for

this study traoes James Madison's doctrine of

22
~

Andrew C. ldioLaughl.in, The Cont'ederation and the Cons ti tu(New York, 1905'), pp. 121... 122.
,-

23BdVlard l{;clTall Burns, James Mediaol}, Philosopher
Cons ti tutlon O.ew Brunswick, 1935), P. 10"

2!. .2

12
Na. tiona1 sovereignty as he expressed it in Pl-:t11ade1phia, tha.t historio summer of 1787.
Before following Ma.dison through the Convention, it is neoessary to set the s tags upon whioh this American drama was enaoted, to study the immortal actors, who joined Madison, in framing

our Constitution.

In any study or trw Convention, we are eter-

nally indebted to two of: the delegates for the notes tl1GY left to
posteri 'by.

I<':trst, we are indebted to James Madison, for his notes

on the debates,

~afted

diligently during the days of the Conven-

tion, and published posthumously for the benefit of scholars and
patriots.

Seoondly, we

~e

indebted to a delegate from

C~orgiaJ

one William Pieree. 2~.
Pierce left us brief and ooncise sketches of the important
men who were outstanding in mouldIng our Constitution.

About his

own oharaoter, Pierce 1s silent, and prefers to leave those who
ohoose. to speoulate on it.
tinction

o~

He

clairns~for

himself only the dis-

a military record. loyal service to state, and Country

as a Congressman, and,

~lnally,

took part 1n tbs G:reat Debate.

his short sketches of the men

who

\Ve now s'Ul1'1l'rlarize the sketahes of

Madison, and his more important colleagues.
James Madison, Pierce writes, supplied the finest leadership,
and, with the exoeption of James Wilson, his was the keenest in-

tellect.

Though not an orator, he vias "a moat Q[;l"eeable sic

24Doouments Illustrative of: the Formation of' the Union of' the
A.merican State!!, ad. Char>les Tanilil ·~Washington,J:927). ,., - -

13
eloquent, and oonvinoing speal{er-. tt

On every debate, he was the

best informed, and had the most correct know1odge of: the affairs
of the United States.

In Cong;ress, Madison was one of the ablest

members t1that ever sat in that Council."

About thirty-seven years

of age, he was an agreeable person, modest in countenance, and ot
controlled emotions. 25
George Washington was esteemed by all as the
Chief t of the late Amerioan Army.

Co~mander

in

Having led the States to inde-

pendenoe and viotory, he again left his beloved eata te, to devote
himself' to framing the goverrunent.

Deliverer ot his Country, pol-

itioian, statesman, most honored citIzen, leader of men, all these
was Washington.

rn:16

General sought to make himse I f usei'ul to his

beloved Countrymen.

It 1s only na tt.trtal that the delegates elected

htm Presiding Officer of

tl~ convention. 26

James Wilson ranked among the fqremost in legal and po1itioal
acumen.

Government was Wilson's consUtidng interest; he

everything that

mi~~t

Ai

•

tud:1ed

make him more expert in political soience.

He knew human natt.1r'e, the history of political institutions, the

causes and effects of every Revolution, from the days of ancient
Greece, until the Amerioan Revolution.

Yet, Wilson was no orator.

He was clear, oopious, and comprehonsive, drawing the attention of
his listeners, not by eloquence, but by oogent reasoning.

Vlhen

thE

lit·
Convention opened, Wilson was still a young man in his forty-fifth
year,27
Another Pennsylvania delegate, whose prestige and wisdom further enhanced the gathering, was Benjamin Franklin.
the

~eatest

philosopher of early Amerioa, he understood all

operations of nature.
uberanoe:

Proolaimed
tl~

Pierce almost defied him in adulatory ex-

ttthe very heavens obey him, and the clouds yield up

their lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. n

As yet, he had no

claim to fame as a politician, nor did his interest extend to the

frays of too pol! tical arena.

Though eighty--two years old, his

mind was sharp, his story-telling the highest at: entertainment. 28
Also, trom Pennsylvania, was the verbose and c;arrulous 'Jouvevnetl!' MOI'ris.

He was "one of those Genius's slott in whom the

highest talents combined to malee him a conspicuous and sucoess.tul
His rhetoric was sublime, empellished with smooth tlowlng

orator,

periods that enthralled his audienoe t6r hours on end.

Even his

reasoning was garbed in the lightsome simile and me taphov.

fortunately, his logic left muoh to be desired.

Un-

Ilnough brilliant

of speeoh, widely read, and a savant of the Boiences, his thought
\'J8.S

ttrickle and inoonstant. tt

Though bred to the Bar, he chose

business with his Brother, Robert, in preference to the world of
litigation.

27Ibid.

-

Gouverneur Morris was also conspiouous by his wooden

101.
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lC:J; and badly marred arm, the results of a youthful accldent. 29

Racer Sherman, to the Madison-Vl11son contingent, was the villain of the Great Debate.

He exhibited the oddest sJ:mped charac-

ter Pierce had encountered.

He was a strange oombination of awk...

wardness and forceful logic.

His odd clothing,· the vulgarisms of

his speech, and his Ustrange New r::ng1and oantn made his speeches

almost laughable; yet, no man bad
head. ft

Victory was

til

ua

better heart or a clearer

bab! t with Sherman, failure a total stranger

In early life, he was a oobbler.

Ambitious and industrious, he

became an Almanack pl'inter, a Judge, a Member of Congress, and ..
now, at sixty was chosen to :represent his State in this highly
touted gathering of patr1ots. 30
Alexander Hamilton, of Hew York, did not take a prominent
part in the arguments.

Still, he deserves mention as onG of' the

most talented men to ride into

Ph11a~elphia.

ed soholar, he had strong, clear

jud~ent,

A lawyer and f'inish,

smooth prose style. and

an ability to win both the head and heart of his listener.
voice was feeble; but his deli very was oonvincing.

His

Smell of stat-

ure, lean, and apparently vain, this talented New Yorker was then
only thirty-three years of age. 31
After l:fay 25th, the d&legates devoted two days to the details

-

29 Ibid •

101-102.

30Ibid.

97 ...98.

-

31Ibld.

98 ....99.
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of organization and prooedure.
elected President of the

George Washington was unanimously

prooeedinf~s;

William Jackson was elected

Secretary; and a COl11mittee of Hules was appointed.

With Washing-

ton's eloction to the Presidenoy, Madison and the nationalists had
already mn a Victory.

Although he expressed hlmseli' only \'1118n

necessary, Washington was convinced of the need for strong government.

"My wlsh is J n Washington wrote to !lJladison,

ft

tha t this Con-

ventien lnay adopt no temporizine expedients, but probe

tl~

defects

of the Oonstitution to the bottom, and provide a radical oure,
whether agreed to or not."3 2 Jackson apparently suffered from
over-work or sloth.

As a result, we are Indebted to Madison for

our best reoord of the debates.
Once Officers bad been elected and prooedut'e settled, Mudison
presented

~~s

Virginia Plan, on May

Since this Plan is oonsidered the
emerged in many respects as ow

29, through

v~r~

C~vernor

Randolph.

of Madison, and since it

flnish~a

Const! tution, we should

unders tand the Plan, before embarking on a study of' the Convention.
Randolph began by resolving that the Articles of Confederation should be "oorreoted and enlarged n to provide
security of liberty and general welf'are. tf

tf

common defense,

Thus, nothine is said

to indicate that tlw Virgin1a delegation hoped to go beyond the
authorization given by ConGress, namely, to revise the Articles.
Hex t, he reso 1 ved that suffrage should be proportioned to the quo-

32Bancroft, II, p. 5.
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tas of' contribution or number of .free inhabitants.

The National

Lagislattwe was to consist of two branches, the first elected by
the people of the States, the second by the !llEH:lbers of the first,
out of' a num.ber of persons nominated by individual ~gislatures.
As an indication that the Legislators would owe their first loyal-

ty to the National government, it was stipulated that they hold no
offices established by a. State.
IJhe Sixth Resolution of the Plan dealt with the National Leg-

islature.

'l'he new Legislature would possess "the Legislative

rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and, moreover, to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which ~le harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of' individual Legislation."

Congress would

also r~ve power of negative over State laws dee~ed contrary to the
Constitution.

If' any State tailed to~ follow the Consti tut1on,
•

foroe would be used by the 8.utmr1zati()n 01' the National Legislature. 33

After the proposals f'or the Legislature, Randolph turned to
the National E.xecutive.

He (the Magis tra te) would be chosen by

the National Legislature, would receive a fixed compensation, and
oould be ineliGible for a second term.

In addition to the duty to

~xeeute the laws, ~le ~~ecutive would have all the powers vested in

;ongress under the Articles. 34

18
The Executive, with n chosen number of the National Judtciary,
Vlould compose a Council of Revision with two-fold powers, namely,

to examine the acts of the Legislature, before they shall operate,
and to study every act of' a State Legislature, before a negat:i.ve

shall be final. 35
The Virginia Plan resolved tilat a National Judiciary be established wi t11. one or more supreme tribunals and several inferior
tribunals to be ohosen by the National Legisle. ture.

The inferior

Courts would hear in the .first instance, while the supreme would
hear and determine in the dernier instanee. 36

The Plan provided for the admission of new states, stating
that they could be admItted by the National Legisle.ttre with a

J.'i1Qjori ty Hless than the whole" body.

A Republican ropro of govern-

Tn.ent was to be guaranteed to each State. 3?
Provision was made for

Con~ess ~to

continue wi th all its au-

thority until the ftreform n of the Articles would be adopted.
vision should be made for amendment of

tl~

Pro-

proposed Articles of

Union without the consent of the National Legislature.

The LegIs-

lative, Exeoutive and Judiciary- powers within the states should be
bound to support the Constitution.
Finally, the Plan provided the. t the amendnK::1nts offered by

3.5 Ibid • 118.

3? Ibid.
-

36 Ibid •
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this Gonvention ought to be subml tted to an assembly or a.ssemblies
of Hepresentati ves reoommended by t...~e several Legislatures to be

expressly chosen by the people, Uto oonsider nnd deoide thereon."}
':t.thls ra.dioal proposal, though submitted as a mere series of
amendments to the Al:'ticles, was in real! ty a proposal for a neVi,
powerful National government.
problems besetting the

It was Madison's answer to the

governL~nt

under the Artioles.

This new

proposal would have the government based not solely on the individual S tatea, but upon the people of the Sta tea.

opinion, the Plan

~rovided

problems faoine the Nationt

In M.cLaughlin's
tl~

three most explioit answers to

(l) the negative power of the Nation-

al Legislature over State laws oontravening "in its oplnlon tt the
Articles of Union; (2) the power vested in the National Legislature to use .foroe against reoalei trant members not fulfilling
their duties under the Articles of U11ion; (3) trl$ Legisla ti ve,
}i~xecutive

"

and Judiciary powers wi thin ,-the States to be bound to

support the Articles of Un10n. 39
Prom a study of this Plan, r/e can infer Ma.dison's :poll tical
philosophy at the Converl tiont s dawn.

On many of his proposals,

ho ,vas foreed to oompromise; on otmrs t his Dootl"lne evolved, and
in years to come he ohanged l"adically.
work

~Ol"

We are interested in his

a strong National government at the Convention, a govern-

39UcLaughlln, Constitutional Jlistory, pp. 155-157.
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msnt that he hoped would mterlalize through proportional representation, a strong Executive, popular election of at least one
branoh of the National Legislature which would in

i<;xecut1ve, and

tm

National negative.

tt~n

elect the

These, 1n our estimation,

are the heart of the argtt.YJ1ent, and by studying them, we hope to
present a clear outline of his politioal philosophy :tn the summer
of 1787.

The New Jezasey Plan, presented as a oounter-proposal to the
Virginia Plan, was striotly a modification

or

the Articles.

It

would give Congress power to tax and regulate commerce; it provided for a better ays tem of requis1tlone i"rom the states by allowing Congress to force states to pay if a majority of them agI'sec

that force must be used.

an

F~ecutive

Undor this Plan, the States would select

of several persons who would appoint a Federal Judi-

ciary with power to hear in the

firs~

instance cases Involving im•

peach.'11ent of' Federal Officers, and to serve as Appalls. te Court in
tho dernier instance .for cases involving the Pederal Government,
!Jipacy, or foreIgners. ho
All acts and treaties made by Congress would be the supreme

law of the land for the States, when they involved tho States or
their c1 tizens.

The FederalE:xecuti va would be empowered to use

force when a recalcitrant state refused to recognize this supreme
law.

Although such resolut;ions Vlould strengthen the £"overmnent.

21
the Plan did not go far

enouc~h

to please the Uationalists, mos't of

whom came froLl the large States.

The GOvernment vv'Ould still be

based not on the people, but on the individual states, an(:- the
evils of the Articlos would still harass the land.
With a knowledge of the delegates, the procadut"e, the Officers, and the two opposine Plans I we are able to follow Madison

through the vicissitudes of tho Convention, as he, more than any
other man, moulds our Constitution into the "chain of' iron" which

amazed the world.

As both sides lined up ln !9?lm preparation for

the taslt ahead, the words of the venerable leader of men in the
President's chalr rang through Independence Hall.

ln the Hand of' God. fl

ttT'his event is

In the Virginia State Convention, villen fic;h.tine :for ratification of the oompleted ConstitutIon, Madison told the delegates
"that tho organization of the general govertL.'1'lent was in all its
parts difficult," and that "there was a peculiar difficulty in
that of tl~ Exeoutive."

In the Constitutional Convention, Janws

Wilson had said, "this subject has greatly divided the House, and
\'Jill also divide the people out of doors. ttl

It is claar that th.e election of the Executive greatly puzzled our Founding }athers.
an

I~xecutive

Discussion of methods of eleotion of

runs through Madison t s notes like a thread.

The sub-

ject was firs t mentIoned on Friday, June l, by James WiIsqn, when
he moved that election be by the people,

by ROGer Sherr:Jln, of connecticut. 2

a motion that was opposed

Two week.s In tel', when the Com-

mi t tee of the Whole reported on the Virginia Plan, they incol"porat.

ed the very words Handolph had used when speaking of the Executive
I!to be chosen by the National Legis1atul'>e for the terrn. of

----

~,'\a.x Parrand, nComprOl.~lises of' the Gonstitut:i.on,tt Amerioan
Historical Association An.~ual Repor.!, I, (1903), p. 80.
2Tansll1. p. 134.
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years.")

As it sIDod in this report, the method of election Vlould

please no one, with the possible exception of the small States,
providin~-;;

the Senate had a prominent pa.rt in this clnice.

Two days af'ter this report by the Comm.1 ttee of the \'V'hole,

delega tes fx-om the larger States contended wi th those of ti1.e small
over election of the Executive,

The small States, confident that

control of the Senate would be theirs, hoped likewise to control
the Executive by having the National Legislature elect him,

Con-

versely, delegates from the larger states hoped to have the people
elect the Executive.

While Martin and Shern'1Qo debated with morris

raIson, and Pinckney, on election of' tho Executi va, Madison kept
hIs peace, perhaps preparing what would be his longest speech in

the Convention.

On Thursday, July 19. Luther Martin moved that

the Executive, since his election was by the Legislature, be inellg1.ble for re-election,. lest he bec;ome too dependen t on those
who ele cted h1m.

"

Ru:fus King then suggested that some torm of election by the
people, possibly through ale ctora, would be best.

Paterson's ideas were similar to those of King,

This time
He proposed that

t:bree electors be allowed to a large State, one to a small,
V!llson remarlmd that it was apparent that all feared election by

the Legislature, unless the man be ineligible for a second term.
lIe was delighted to see tlthat too idea was gaining ground, of an

election media. tely or immedia tely by the people.,,4
At this point, Madison thought the time had coma for him to
express h19 ideas on eleotion of a.n Executive.

He began by re.

minding ell that it was a fundamental principle of free government

that tho Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers should be
separately exercised, and it is just as fundamental that they be
independently exercised.

It is a necessary part of free govern-

ment that the F!xecut1ve be independent and separate from. the other
branches.

He explained that the coal1 tion of the two former

could be immed:tately dangerous to l1berty.

power~

To him it seemed essen"

tial that the Exeoutive be elected by some source that would enablE
him to be free fitom any dependenoe on the Legislature."
Once Iiiadison established his point on separation of powers,
he hastened to add that this separation could not exist if one
branch ohos$ the other, that is. if o,na was dependent on the other,
1

He contended that even wi th Ineligiblltty for a second term, this
procedure would wed the tv/o branches} intr1gu,es a.nd contentions
would certainly follow.

For these reasons. he was disposed to re-

fer the appointment to some other body.

The people at large was,

in his opinion, the finest body to elect the Exect1tl va.
fessed his fal th in the people as electors by

concludin~~

He prothat the

people \vould choose a distinguished rJagistrate, whose nerits and

4Ibid. 412.

-

I'

!)atriotism had already rendered him va.luable to the He. tion. t)
In this same speech, Madison act"'11itted one SGxwious difficulty
in the popular election 01: a President.

Since the northern states

had a larger voting population than the southern, the latter could

not duly influenoe the election.

Thel:'ef'ore t he committed himself

to election by electors, as the method open to the fewest objec"
-{';ions. 7

We must remember, however, that Uadlson considered the

electoxwal method election by the people, since the people chose

the electors.

By popular election through the electors, he hoped

to strengthen Ua. tional Government.

Six days later, 'Madison thought the eleotion Shollld be by

some speoial Quthori ty derived fl:'om the people, 01" by the people
themselves.'8 He offered three objeotions to election by tl» Legislature.

In the first place, elect10n would diVide the Legisla-

ti ve, and publle interest would

su.ff'e~.

~lOuld intrigue wi th the Legislature

Isubservient to them.

Seoondly, the candidate

$1n4" render his administration

'J!h1rdly, foreign powers could resort to in-

trigue and influence the ale otion. 9
lior did he approve of election by state Legislatures, since

lin this case, the F...xeouti va might be subservient to thase smaller

6Ib1d •

41.3.

Ibid
9Ibid •

~-49.

7Ib1d •
- •
3
-

4h9-450.
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Legislatures .10
Madison insisted that the option was between electors chosen
by the people and the people themselves.

ple would control the election.

In both oases, the peo-

He pre1'erred the mode whereby the

people at large or the qualified part of them would choose the
,-. cuti va. 11
;.'Jxe

Despite the objections that people would be preju-

dioed in favor of oitizens of their

ow~

State, and that the south-

ern states would have less voice in the election, Madison p!'eferred it to all other alternatlv6s. 12

As late as September 12, Hadlson was st!ll explaining his
repugnance to Legislative eleotion of

tl~

ExecutIve.

I~

repeated

the objection that suoh a procedure would render the Exeouti ve

dependent on this other branoh.
.for similar reasons.

Nor were the Ju.dges fit electors

The purpose of election by the people was to

defend the Exeoutive and to "prevent ,popular or faotious 1nju8tice. tt13

When the Committee on St,yle presented the1r

dra~t

of Execu-

tive eleotion, I4adison approved the wording, and oonfidently remarkod:

nHe is now to be elected by the people. It

W1 th the Execu-

tive eleoted by the people, the first branoh of' the government

10Ibid • 450.
llIbid
450-451.
-12
_
Ib1d
451-452.
l3 Ib1d 715.

_.
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\"lOuld be Independent of State Legislatures ~ the National Legisla ..
ture, the Judiciary, and an arbitrary handful ot
By his arguments
Madison hoped to

fo~

popular election of the

s~engthen

attempted to lodge as much
people.

eleotors.l~.
F~ecutive,

the oentral government.
powe~

He and Wilson

as possible in the hands of the

By giving power to the people, they

l~ped

to strengthen

the National government, and prevent an excoss of power on the
part of the states.

Madison oonsistently refused to oountenanoe

election by the Legislative or Judicial branohes of the National

government, because this would hinder the separation and independence o:f the three branches.

Throughout the Convention,

r\~adison

considered the granting of more power to the people the best way
to strengthen the National government. 15

Madison desired popularelectlon of the Exeoutive.

A study

of his arguments for the mode of elec,t1ng the Legislative branch
reveals that he also approved ot popular election of this •branch

of the govarnroont.

To study Madison t s arguments for Legisla ti ve

election, it will be neoessary to return to the early days of the

Convention, and watch how
In the Virginia.

Plan~

tl~

discussions developed.

Madison reoommended the. t the First

House of the Legislature be elected by the people.
would then ale ct the seoond House.

This House

Dy this expedient, tl1e people

l!:'Fa:rrand, ftCompromisEls, n I, 82.

15It seems that Madison hoped to v/eaken sta.te powers by
transferring power to the people of' the Un! ted States.
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and not the States would directly control the f'irst House, and indirectly the seoond. 16

On Ma.y

31, Roger Sherma.n

m. . ose to objeot

to popular election of' either branch of the National Legisla.ture.
r~

Since

thought the people easily mislead, he preferred election

by the state Legislatures.

Gerry t:lgl."eed wi th Sherman, but Wilson

and Colonel Mason sided with the Virginia Plan.

\>1;1l80n pointed

out that no governroont could exist .ror long witlwut participation
by the People.

Furthermore, be believed that state Legislatures

should be weakened, whereas

Sl~rmants

objection would give more

power. 17
Madison hastened to the assistance of Mason and Wilson, since
he sincerely considered the "popular election of one branch of the
lSational
ment. n

18

Legislat~e

He

as essential to every plan of :free govern-

contended that the first branch, if' elected by the

states, would be controlled by the states, and not by the people.
If the first were elected by the pgopl.··, the people would control

both branches, even if the second were elected by thf.:J firlld;.

He

thou [,;ht, too, that the ttg:r:'eat fabric to be raised ,vould be more

stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of

the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of' the Legislatures. n19

125-126.
126.
126-l27 •

~~------------------------~
29
Although Gerry again expressed disagreement, it was agreed by
vote that the people should elect the f'irst branch of' the I':fa.tional
a~ee

Legisla.ture, but as the delegates were unable to

on election

of the second branch, the question was def'erred. 20

Six da.ys la.ter, in Committee of the

~~role,

Charles Pinckney

:Joved that the tffirst branoh of the Na.tional Legislature be elect ...
ed by the state Legislatures, and not by the people. If

'rhis motion

was hastily seconded by John Rutledge, of South Carolina.

Elbridge

CT6rry expressed disagreel1lent \vi th this attempt to undo the affirm-

s. ti va vote by May 31.

~'requently,

he said., the worst type of men

belong to state Legislature, men who are not fit to elect the National Legislature; f'urthermore, he insisted, it was neoessary

I'OI'

the people to elect at least one branch in order to inspire confidenoe. 2l James Wilson added that the only reason representation

was neoessary was that the people
to conduct their government.

!n.8leb~

were too unwieldy to

He insisted that they would

at taohed to a government of their own ohoosing. 22

be more

Sherman arose

to oontend that election by the people would abolish State Legis-

latures.

He thought a binding force between state and national

Legislatures could be established if the States elected the Hation ..
al LegIslature. 23

20 Ibid •

21

127-129.

23 Ibid •

160.

Ibid •

22 Ibid •

159-160

160-161.

30
After

~llilson

and Mason, to the chagrin of Hoger Sherma.n, had

defended popular election of the Legislature" Madison arose to
bolster their arguments.
election of'

!l

~east

So convinced was he of the necessity for

one branch by the people, that he considered

it a clear prinoiple or free

gpver~ment.

It avoided too great an

influence of' the State governments in the general one. 21~

tIe also

begged to ditt'er from the member from Connecticut, Hoger Sherman,
on his concept of the objects that required a National government.

Sl1&rman admitted faction and oppression in the States.

This very

admission proved that the sphere of' the National .government should
be enlarged.

It was incumbent on us, he said, to try this pro-

posed remedy, and to frame a Republican system on such a scale and
in suoh a rorm as will control all the evils experienoed. 25
After Madison, Dickerson announced his concurrence with the
delegate !'rom Virginia, the. tat

leas~

ttlre should be chosen by t11$ people.
!1Orted Uadison.

one branch of the Legisla•
Head and Wilson also

Stlp-

When the vote was talcen on Plnclcney's proposa.l

that the eleotion of the Legislature be not by the people, but by
the states, it was defeated with only New Jersey, Connecticut, and

South Carolina voti ng in the at'.firmative. 26
'fl''lree months later, the Committee on Style reported that the

161-163.
161... 162.
163-165.
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lIou. sa of Representatives shall be elected every second year by the

people of tho several States.

As f'or the Senate, tfi..,is branch

Vlould be elected by the State Legislatl.:lres. 27
Vle

have seen that Madison hoped to strengthen the Fodoral

;:overnment, and check the errant tendencies of the Sta tea by reposing the power of election of an Executive in the people at
large.

He also suooeeded in strengthening the government by al-

lowing the people to elect the Lower House.

He Vlould have nre-

farred popular eleotion of' the Senate, or at least election by the
Lower House, but un til the twentieth century, this l)1"anoh would be
chosen by the Legisla tmoes.

CHAPTER III

THE

FEDI~RAL

NEGA TI VE

In the Virginia Plan, submitted liay 29, there was a provision
that the national Legislature "negative all laws passed by the

several states, contravening in the opinion of the National
lature the Articles of Union."l

I~gis

One authority on the Convention,

says that the men who defended this proposed negative were still
comparing the projected government with forlner Eri tish rule of' the
Colonies. 2 James Madison considered it essential and "could not
but regard an indefinite power to negative Legislative acts of' the
states as absolutely necessary to a perfect system."3
Madison's biographer says that in h1.s striving for a powerf'u1
government, he won wl~re he deserved"to win, and lost whe~e he deserved to lose.

One argument he deserved to lose was his oonten-

tion for a Federal negative;h the plan was simply unworkable for
myriad reasons,.

It is no t the purpose of' this Chapter to defend

ITansll1, p. 117.
2!1CI.e.ugh11n,

!h!. Confederation,. p. 206.

311adison, Wri tinr:s, III, 121.

Burns, Madison, p. 99.

4-Brant, James Madison, pp. 128-131.
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Madison t s ideas on the negative.

To study his reasons for the

negative is helpful, however, to an understanding of his Doctrine
oi' st:rong National sovereignty.

Yea:rs later, Madison would ref'Use

to take responsibIlity for his defense of the negative

j

although

five days bet'o:re the Convention adjou:r-ned, he still thought judicial review was inadequate to prevent the states from disrupting
the

:F~deI'al

Goverlll.U$ut.

;;

The notes of Robert Yates report that Madison argued for a

negative to avoid use of foroe.

"To prevent this disagreeable ex-

pedient," Madison is quoted as saying, tithe power of negativing is
absolutely neoessary--this is the only attractive p:rlnoiple whioh
will retain its oentrifugal farce, and without this the planets
will fly from their orbits. n6
W{adison t s own notes on the debates discuss this same debate
on the negative, and agree with Yates, that the first mention of
it was June 8.

The section is headed 1;1" Madison, nOn a reconsid ...

eration of the cause giving the rlational Legislature a negative on
suoh laws of the states as might , be contrary to the Artioles of
Union, or rl'reaties with foreign Nations .117

By a Federal negative,

:,;adison meant a power resident in the National Legislature whereby
they could, in effect, nullify state laws.

5TanSi11, p. 717.
r-

,)~.

-

7 Ibid.

758.
17l~.

This power 1s similar

to judioial review as exercised by the Supl"eme Court today.

Ac ...

cording to Madison's plan, State laws would be deolared unoonstit;utional by the National Legislature.
Cha!'les Pinckney began the debate by a motion "that tho National Legislature should have authority to negative all laws
(,:l

whioh they should judge to be improper. ItU

(fh6

tenor Pinckney's

argument manifests the ardor of' the South Carolinian for a govern[;lent to whioh the states could be wholly subordinate.

Whan Pinckney surrendezted the floor, Madison seconded his motion.

Madison oontended that an indefinite negative power on leg-

islative aots of the states was
governmen·t • 9

neoessa~J

for a perfeot system of

He argued that government under the Artioles had

taught American leaders several lessons, among them that the states
oonstantly tended to in.fringe on the authority of the National Government.

l'ratlonal treaties, he said. were violated with impunity;

the rights of one state were ignored by- another; the vieaker party
was always repressed. 10 He proposed a negative to meet these difficulties, as the wisest expedient for preventing state mischief.
A

negative power 'WOuld not only allow the government to deal with

state enoroaohments, but would prevent the states from attempting
to over-step their rights.

8~.
9Ib1d •

lOIb:td.

-

174.
174-175.

He feared foroe if a negative ,vere not
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adopted.

If Massaohusetts, for instanoe, would deoide to defy ·tills

National Government, he feared the National forces could not oompel her to yield, espeoially if she were aided by her neighbors. 1l
Madison feared that the National army would not prevail under such
c trcuma tanoss.

I t seemed to him t..'la t a small port io n of the oom-

munity, acting on the defensive, could bid defianoe to the National C~vernment at will. 12
This proposed negative, Madison reiterated, would render
use of foroe unneoessary.

tl~

Nor would the states, if a negative

were in tlw Constitution, defy the National authority.

Bolstering

his argument for a vigorous negative, Madison exhorted his con-

freres to a negative that would extend to all oases whatsoever.
He then returned to his oherished illustration oJ: the planetary

system, and again insisted that this proposed prerogative of the
Hational Government was the one

prin~1ple

centrifugal tendenoy of the States.

that DlUst counteract the

W~thout a

strong negative,

the states would ndestroy the order and harmony of: the political
system. ft 13
Elbridge Gerry attaohed the negative plan.
power would enalave the states.:t.4

I~

feared suoh a

Roger Sherman proposed an enumeration of cases in which a
negative could be used. lS James Wilson defended Madison's position.

The negative, he insisted, when viewed with a steady and

close eye, was rigpt.

It seemed that there was little danger of

hurting the states, but he feared the states would injure the
whole and let local interests supersede National ones. 16

Dicken-

son also defended the negative lest the States again disrupt the
whole. 11 DeMord, of Delaware. feared the negative was a menace
to the small states.

It seemed unreasonable to h1m for a National

Legislature, miles away, to judge on the Constitutionality of
state Legislation. 18
When Bedford's objection was made, Madison defended his position.

He

admitted that the difficulties were worthy of attention,

and ought to be answered before a vote was talien.
argument, he

thou~~t

a Board could

b~

to give temporary approbation to laws

As to Bedford's

established in each state,
~hich

•
seemed Constitutional,

He suggested that the power of negativing be lodged in the Senate
alone, so that the Lower House could adjourn more freqm ntly,
Turning to Bedford, Madison asked what would happen if' the Nationa 1 Governrne nt oollapsed,
1>Ibid.

16

Ibid ,

17 Ibid.
_.
Ibid

l8

176.
176-177.
177.
177-178.

He doubted it the small States would be
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sater without its protectlon. 19

Wnen

a vote was taken on Pinokney's original proposal, it was

passed in the negative, with only Virginia, Massachusetts, and
PennsylvanIa voting aye. 20
The issue again arose on July 17, when Gouverneur Morris attaoked the power as unneoessary.

When Sherman and Martin joined

the attack, Madison countered with a defense of his negatlve. 21
This time he claimed tt'l...a.t a negative was essential to the security
of

t he general government.

The necess ity of' general government

prooeeded tor the tendenoy of states to proceed on their own.
This propensit.y, he continued, would disturb the community, unless
controlled.

Only a negative could control it.

Madison disagreed

with Shermants opinion that state tribunals could control state
Legislation, since in all the states, these tribunals were dependent on Legislatures.

In Georgia,

nually appointed Judges to these

for~

example, the Legislatu::r:>e an-

Court.,~

In Rhode Island, • the

Judges were displaced by the LegIslature for defendIng the Articles of Confederatlon. 22
A mild and perfect means, Madison olaimed, was necessary to
cheek the states; such a means was the F'edera1 negative.

19Ibid •

20_.

178.

Ibid

--

21Ibid•
22
Ibid

390-391.

Again he

pointed to the Dr1 tiah system whioh revealed the utility of
ative.

Q

neg-

Nothing else could maintain the harmony of the empire but

the negative.

l'l"or was the Crown loath to use this negative for

the good of the whole.

Every Act passed against the central gpv..

ernment was stifled in birth.

He admitted some a.buse of this pre-

rogative, due to favoritism toward one or another part of the

8m...

pire, but he di d not believe the United States of the future would
perpetrate such abuse. 23
After Madison's arguments, Gouverneur Morris bluntly replied
that the very proposal of such a measure Ylould disgust all the
states. 24

Pinckney, according to Madison's notes, defended the

naga tlve. 25 When Pinckney surrendered the floor, another vote was
taken.

Again the measure was defeated, with Virginia, North Car-

olina, and l1assaohusetts voting affirmatively.26
Immediately after the vote
Federal negative,

l~.artln

soun~ing

the death knell of' the

• of: the
proposed that,·the Legislative Acts

Uni ted states be the supreme law 01: the land, and that the judi-

ciaries be oompelled to uphold them.

Anything in the respeotive

state laws to the contrary would be invalid. 27

23 Ibid •

-

24Ibid • 391.
25-Ib1d
-*

26

Ibid
*

27~. 391-392.

This motion of:
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~'ls.rt:tnt

s was a pel'feet answel' to Madison's vorl. sh f'or a check on

sta te Legis lation.

Although Madison co ntinued to defend the neg ...

ative, it seems that Hartin's plan was, in this case, superior.
Madison, in his zeal for strong central l?Pvernment, pre.ferred the
National Legislature to state Courts as a curb on state Legislation. 28
As late as August 17, Pinckney I for the third time, suggested

further dIsoussion of a negative power.
reminded Pinckney that the

.
matter

was acceptable to the majority.29

Sherman, of Gonnecticut,

should rest, since Martin's plan
Madison merely stated his oon-

tinued pref'erenoe for some form of negative. 30

James Wilson did not surrender as easily as Madison.

He

t;hought the firmness of Judges insuffiCient; P..6 was convinced of

the expediency of a negative that could prevent the passage of
laws, rather than a f'eeble power

ths.t~

would declare them void when

already passed. 31
Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Morris all spoke against Madison.
~ll considered the negative impractical and unneoessary.3 2 \f.hen a

vote was taken, New Hampshire and Delaware joined Virginia, Penn28 Ibid •

29

6o~.•

Ibid •

31Ibid.
32rbid.
-

.3°Ibid.

604-605.

sylvania, and Massaohusetts, in support of the nega ti ve; 'New Jersey voted negatively.

The doomed negative was again defeated, six

to rive. 33
r~ter

negative.

in life, Madison attempted to avoid discussion of the
F'ive days before the Convention's olose, he was still

suspioious, however, of judicial review as a oheck on State laws.
In his notes, he quotes himself as saying, "A negs. ti ve on the
state laws alone oould meet all the shapes which tb..ese could asBut this bad been over-ruled. "34

sume.

In summary, then, it is obvious that Madison, during the Convention, never relented in his arguments ror a negative.

He pro-

posed that the National Legislature should review all state Legislation.

Any aots of state Legislatures that, in the opinion of

the National
negatIved.

Legislatt~e,

oontravened the Constitution, could be

As is obvious, Madisonts ylan received little support •

Instead, Martin's judicial review was fl'dopted.

•

Despite the peren-

nial dIfficulties between Legislatures, Congress and Courts, Mar ...
tint s plan seems to have worked in most instances.
heated

a~gunwnts

Madison's

tor a Federal negative revealed his zeal for a

strong Pederal Government; his distrust of state as a check on
state Legislation, revealed his distrust of excessive decentrali.
zation.

33 Ibid • 605.

-

34rbid.

717.

CHAPTER IV

A STROUG YET RESPONSIBIE EXECUTIVE

In forging a strong central government. based on the people
of the states, Madison realized the need of a strong Executive,
who was at the same time responsible to the people and Con~ess
for his actions. l At the time of the Convention, there was a gen-

eral fear of the Executive branch of government.

'TIm Articles had

provided for committees to serve as executive, and a few of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention feared a strong Executive lest the Executive, or Executives, evolve into some form of
monarohy. 2
On the whole, the Convention seemed to favor a strons F...xecutive, although a minority feared the '~a~vent of despotism•• 'Most
~.

.

delegates realized how dismal had been the failure of the F,xecutive Committees under the Articles, but misgivings about possible
monarchy could be effaced by adequate safe-guards.

It was abso-

lutely neoessa.ry to make the Executive eagel:' to comply with tl1.O
demands of his Country.

Such expedients as a suitable term of of-

lBurns I 139 II
2F8.rl"and, ftCompl"omises,t1 80.

fice, responsibility to the people tor election and re-eleotion, a
balance of power between the three branches of government, and the
possibilIty of impeachment, were thought suitable to harness Exeoutive independence.)

Altl~ugh a strong Executive was absolutely

neoessary tor a strong government, too strong an Executive would
defeat the purpose of Republican rule.

Madison realized the need

of a balanoe between the two, the necessity of a strong Exeoutive

and responsibility to the American people.

Throughout the Conven-

tion, in his efforts to establish a powerful government, he argu.ed
I!

for a strong Exeoutive surrounded by adequate safe-guards. 'i
The first time Madison spoke on the Exoouti va branch, was
June 1, when the Committee of the Whole took up Resolution 7, of
the Vu-ginia Plan."

Cb.a.rles Pinckney, who opened the discussion

by expressing the desu-e tor a strong F,xecutive, lnade clear, how-

ever, that he feared any form of'

mon~chy. 6

After Pinokney.s remarks, James \V1lson narrowed the disous-

sion w1 th his motion that the Executive consist of one person.

C. Pinckney seoonded this motion. 7

3~. 161.
4-Burns,

J.44.

5Tans!11, 133.
6Ibid•

-

7~.

131.

G.

Benjamin ITank11n interrupted
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the px-ooeedings to remark on the importance of this subjeot.
Wilson haa tedly arguod with Sherman. Randolph, and
neesss ity tor a single Executive. 9

Ge~~y,

Fl
,,J

over the

Those who opposed Vl1lson's mo-

tion, did so on the grounds that an Bxecutive, if one person,
could be the foetus of mona~chy.lO

So heated was this dispute

over the Executive, that the question was dropped, by common consent, until all could prepare further arguments for their positions. ll
Madison suggested the propriety ot establishing the extent of
T~ecutive autho~ity

rallty.l2

before settling the question ot unity or plu.

He thought a definition of Executive powers would clar-

ify the need for one, or for several Exeoutives.

He moved that

the National Executive have powers to execute the trational laws,
to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for, and to execute
such other powers "not Legislative

no~Judlciary

as may from time to time be delegated
ture. Hl3 Wilson seconded the motion.

bi
c.

in their

the National LegislaC. Pinckney moved that

the 19 words quoted above be dropped as superfluous.

llIb1d.
l2 Ibid •

-

-

l3 Ib1d •

133.

natt~e,

Hadison.

3.0-

ceded to this motion. l4

The i'irat part

o~

44h1s motion was immedi-

ately agreed to. 15
The next day the inevitable question of impeachment arose.
James Dickenson moved that the Executive be t*emoved by the Nation-

al Legislature on request of a majority of' State Legialaturea. l6
Bedrord and Sherman agreed with Dickenson.

Madison, however.

feared auch an expedient would produce an equality of' agency in
~~

small and large States; and he feared that a minority of the people might thus remove the highest Federal officer.

Moreover, he

feared that it might open the door to intrigue against him in

states where his policies, though just. might be unpopular.

YJ1l-

son joined him in objection to such a mixture of state and National authorities. l7 \~n Q vote was taken on Dickenson's motion,
all the States, save Delaware, voted it down. lS

On July 20, Madison again
or impeachment.

expres~ed

himself on the question

•
He thought some words "should be incorporated into

the Consti tution, explaining that impeachment was meant to defend

the OOIllnlunlty against the inoapacity, negligence, or perfidy or
the Chief' Magistrate.

14Ibid •

13.3 ....1.34.

15 Ibid •

l6

134.

Ibid •

141.

17~.

142.

l8 Ibid•

Jl~3.

-

Althou€')l Madison was .for a strong. inde-
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pendent Exeoutive, he
ment.

thou~)tt

impeaohment vital to free govern-

He enumerated the three oases where he thought impeaohment

neoessary_

Limitation of the President.s term was not enough.

He

might betray the Nation to foreign powers; his health might break;
he

might reign despotioally.

was neoessary.

In any of these oases J impeaohment

In the Legislaturo, it was diffioult for many to

betray their trust or lose their oapaoity; the soundness of the
majority would maintain the integrity and ability of the Legisla-

ture.

The F..xeoutive, however, was amninistered

by

one man.

Loss

of oapaoity, corruption, or despotism on his part might prove fatal to the Nation. l9
After Madison had so expressed his desire tor impeacbment, a
vote was taken.

As yet, it was not deoided

would be impeached.

That

~

!2! the Executive

form of impeachment be incorporated

into the Conetitution, all voted aye t exoept Massachusetts, and
south Carolina. 20

"

Madison's biographer says Madison guided the Convention's
thought on another expedient to strengthen tl-J8 Exeeutive--the
veto. 2l Gerry opened discussion of a veto on .Tune t~. He proposed

that the National Exeoutive have power to negative acts of the
Legis lature not afterwards re-passed ttby_ _ _. parts of each

20 Ib1d •

421.

21 Brant ,

40.

Burns, 6!1.•

r
46
branoh of the National Leg1s1at'U.JJe.

tt 22

Wilson and Hamilton sug....

gested an absolute EXeoutive veto. 23
Benjsain Pranklin reminded all of' the danger of such an abso1
lute power in the hands of' one man. 2~, Sherman was against giving
the Executive such pov"er. 25

Madison agreed with the suggestion

for over-ruling an Exeoutive veto by a proper proportion of the
Leeislature.

Few Exeout'.ves would defy the Legislature.

He said

that an absolute negative would certainly be obnoxious to the peopIe, at least in their present aversion to any form ot monarohy.

However, Madison was clearly an exponent of' an 'Rxeoutive veto as
another means of strengthening the National Gover~~nt.26
Vnwn a vote was taken, every state voted negatively on the
motion that an absolute veto power be gttanted, but the issue of
allowing two-thirds of the Legislature to over-rule the revisionary cback passed in the affirmat'.ve. ~7
There was no more discussion of

17. All agreed that the

F~ecutive

the

Exeoutive, until 3uly

should have power to execute

the Uational laws, to appoint to offices not provided for, that
22 Tana ill,

24Ib1d •
23 Ibid•

5

2 Ib1d •

26Ib1d •

-

147.

147-148.
148.

r
1~

be elected by a National Legislature.

It was also agreed to

eliminate the clause of ineligibility for a second term since this
would make the Executive more anxious to please the peoPle. 28
The delegates then turned to discussion of the Executive's
term.

Doctor MeC lurg and Gouverneur Morris moved the. t the F:xecu-

tive hold of rice "during good behaviox-. n29
those with leas monarchial leanings.

This motion oort'ii'led

Shel'rnan said that the Exec-

utive, now eligible fol' a second term, was already destined to
hold office during good behaviour. 30 Madison repeated his previous arguments rox- a strong and responsible Executive.

It was most

essential to liberty, said Madison, that the Bxecutlve, Legislative, and Judiciary powers be

se~ate.

It was essential to a

maintenance of this separation that they be independent of each
other, but the Executive could not be independent of the Legislature if dependent on it for re-eleot1:.on.
make the Leg1slatUl"'6 not only the

tnak~,

Suoh a. dependence would
•

but, 1tl aff'ect, the ex ..

eoutor of the laws.

Ty:rann1oal laws would be TI1B.de. he .feared, and
oarried ou~ in a tyrannioal manner.3 l
Madison thought tOOl'6 was, in several respects, an analogy
28

396.

2 9!!?ll.

396-397.

30Ib1d •

397.

Ib1d
"

31 Ibid • 397-398.

-

~.8

between the Exeoutive and Judloiaroy depat'tments. 32
€louted certain laws, the former others.

The latter ex-

The fermer expounded and

applied them for cerots.in purposes, as the latter did

1"01'

others.

'nne difference between them seemed to oonsist ohiefly in two oiroumstances--the collective interests and security were much more
in the power of tbe Executive than the Judioiary department.

Sec-

ondly, 1n e.dministvation the Executive had mora latitude for discretion

~lan

the Judiciary.

Iw consIdered it absolutely necessary

for a well constItuted Nation, the. t the Legisle. ture and Executive
department s be separated completely.

Doctor MoClurg's motion

aimed at keep1ng the Executive free from dependence on the Legislative department, and such a motion demanded fair bearine, although it was another question whether it was workable or not. 33
Colonel Mason objected strenuously to Madisonts arguments, on

the ground that tenure during good

b~havlour

tenure for life.

s~,

tion with

No State, he was

was comparable to
•

would acoept such flirta-

lUonarohy.34 At Mason's insinuations, Madison again was

on his feet.

His real a1m, he said, was to prevent the introduo-

tion of monarchy.

He had no fear of being considered a monarchist

32 Ibid•

In a foot-no te 1 Madison explains that these views
were inser~ed to parry objecvions likely to fallon Doctor
McClurg t s motion that the Exeoutive hold office during good behaviour. McClurg. s reason was desire to make the I~ecutive independent of the Legislature. As we have seen, Llad:i.son concurred
wit h this, and preferred to have the people ele ct the Exeouti va.

33 Ibid• 397-398.

-

34Ibid • 398.
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He hoped to obviate the dangerous tendency in our government to
throw all to the Legislative branoh.

He warned that future revo-

lutions would tollow unless this trend toward Legislative omnipotenoe were ohecked.

In devising a Republican gpvernment, he urged
all to keep in view the basic principles of such government. 35
MoClurg supported Madison's
of monarchy.

I~

renmrl~

by expressing his hatred

was zealous, however, to make the Exeoutive in-

dependent of the Legislatwe in the Republican form ot f:Pvernment
they hoped to erect.

Therefore, he repeated his preference for
Exeoutive tenure during good behaviour. 36 Tbis motion was passed
in the negative. 37
In Madison's defense of McClurg, he again showed his desire
for a strong government with a strong Executive.
l~

would show this preference again.

that the Executive be Joined to the

Four days later

On July 21, Wilson moved

in the revisionary
power. Madison quiokly seconded thi~ 'll1<?tion. 38 He thought the
motion of "great importanoe to the meditated Const1tut10n. n39 It
~udiolary

would enable the Judicial department to inspire additional confidence against Ilegislative encroaoh."JlEmt.

35 Ibid

398 ...399.

36Ibid.

37 Ibid.

399.

38Ibid.

39_.
Ib1d

422-423423.

_<Ie

It would enable the Leg...

50
islative department to preserve the integrity of public servants.
It would enable the whole community to guard against unwise and
unjust measures.

He rejected the objection that this gave too

much power to the E!xeoutl va and Judicial departments.
danger, he repeated, was too strong a Legislature.

The real

Every power

given to the other departments was a step in the right direction.
Nor did he consider the proposed revision with the Judges any vio ....

lation of separatIon of

~~eoutiv.

and Judicial branol19s.

On the

contrary, he thought such association in the revisionary power
would further preolude any encroachments of one department on the

other, and would serve to maintain distinotion of the three branohes.

If such a union were an improper m1xtLwe of powers, then it

seemed to him equally improper to allow the Executive any participation whateV81' in the making of laws, and the revisionary plan
should be disoarded altogether. ItO
This pttoposed plan o£ Judicial asilociation v/ith the 1~.xecut1ve
in revision of laws, championed by Madison and Wilson, was defeat-

ed with only Connecticut and V1rg1rd.a voting in the afflrme.tive.~·l
T11l"oughout the Convention, Madison f'ought to forti.fy the central gOV91'nnwnt by giving vast powetts to the Bxeoutive.

At the

same time he sug.gested checks on the T:xeoutive's independenoe.
¥;!hile he agreed that the Bxeouti ve, ii' negligent or incapable I

hOIbid.

h23-tr·21.:.•

4.l Ibid.

L129.

-
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should be impeached; be was careful. however, toenume:rate oases

when impeachment was deemed neoessary.
insisted
ings.

t~At

Most important of all, he

the State Legislatures have no part in

tl~

proceed-

'rhis was another exartJ.ple of his desire to weaken "the powers

of the S ta. tes
.., •
14adison was instrumental in incorporating the famous veto
power into

OlW

Constitution.

Prudently he opposed the absolute

veto, that is, the veto which does not include the provision that
for re-passage, two-thirds of the Legislature must vote aye.
purpose of the veto was to prevent TAgislative despotism.

The

Sinoe

the Executive was responsible to the people alone, and not to
states or state Legislatures, the veto power enhanoed the power of
the National Government.
In Madison's defense of McClurg's argtUuents for tenure dwing
good

behaviot~,

he

a~in

independent Magistl'ate.

indicated his preference for a strong,
"

Under such a system the gxecutive would

have no worry about what the State Legislatures or the Senate
thought.

He could follow his oonscienoe.

It was the people who

determined Good beb.aviour.
Madison and Wilson also hoped to j01n the :E;xecutive with the
Judges in the l'evisionary power, but their argument was not accepted by the other delegates.

Madison supported this participa-

tion of the F..xecutive in rev:i.sion of laws as another means of
strengthening the Bxecutive.

Throughout the Convention, Madison

argued time and time again for a vigorous Chier Magistra. te.

These

52
m.yriad argu.roonts refle cted his desire :ror strong central rule.

CIIA P'l'BR V
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
In discussing Congressional represontat ion, Hedison dei'ended
proportional representation, that is, representation based on the
number of' people in a state.

He prei'erred this plan of' representation to that based on the states. l Under tb..e Articles, there

was equality of' su.ffrage; under Madisonts new plan this system
would be abolished.

Prom the out-set, Madison souf)1t to convinoe

his oonfreres that proportional representation was an important
pillar in the National Government.

As early as 111ay 30, he moved

that "the equality of suITrago establist~ed by the Articles of Can ....
federat ion ought not tc prevail in the National Legislature, and
that an equitable ratio of represont~tion ought to be sub~titu
ted.

n2

Georse Read imnediately objected to this early proposal.
reuunded the delegates

tl~t

Delaware had issued speoif'io instruo-

tions against any change of sufiraga.
ITansl11, 123-124.
?

~Ibid.
I'

122-123.

He

If Delaware' s

w~.shes

were

54
not respected, he threatened to withdraw. 3

Gouverneur Morris re ....

gretted the imminent danger of Delaware's secession, but with a
touoh of saraiSffi, he I"emlnded them that if disoussion of sui'frage
offended them, suah discussion, nevertheless, was necessary to tl'l...8
success of the Convention. Ii-"
Madison interposed an observation.

Whatever the reason for

equality of suffrage under the Articles, he thought it should
cease when a National Government replaced a Federal.

In the for-

mer case, he sald, the government was wholly dependent on the
States; in this case, it would be dependent on the people. 5 There
was as much reason for proportional representation in the National
Legislature as there was for dlf1'erent representation in a state
Legislature of Counties of dif'f'erentsizGs.

After Madison's

speech, all agreed to postpone discussion of representation. 6
Three weeks later, Madison agaip-.defended proportional rep•

resentation.

The men .from new Jersey "and Delaware thought it un-

just to allow

V~ginia

a greater vote than Delaware.

Madison re-

minded them that Virginia was sixteen times the size of Delaware.
These same men oonsidered it just to allow Virginia, with its
sprawling territory, the same amount of representation as little

3Ibid •

""i'"Ibid.
11

-

r1

6Ibid •
'?Ibid.

123.

123-124.
124.
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Delaw~e.

He attaoked the whispered proposals o£ some small state

men to divide the Nation into Thirteen separate but equal States.
This was impraotioal sinoe the manners, modes of land tenu.re, hab.
its and prejudices in the states differed.

A voluntary amalgama-

tion of small states with their neighbors would be more oonvenient
ror the Country as a whole.

He reminded them

of the imminent en-

trance of Western states into the Union, which States, upon en...

trance, wottld have few citizens.

If' proportional representation

were adopted, these S~ates ~uld not be able to rule the old. 7
On June

27, and 28, Martin delivered one of hiB verbose

speeohes on State sovereignty.8

John Lansing and John Dayton a-

greed with him that suffrage under the new government shOUld be

the srune as the old, that is, equal votes for each state. 9 Hugh
Yi illiarnson, of Horth Carolina, reminded them of the danger of
\"Testern states; if equality of suffrti!ge were adopted, he feared
the new States might rule the old. lO ".

Madison professed a desire to oonour in any expedient that
would remove the diffieulty over representation, but the arguraents just advanoed seemed unjust.

£Ior vias equal suf'frage nec-

essary f'or the proteotion of the rights

7Ibid.

-

226-234.

of}

the small states.

He
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reminded them that Paterson's plan of land division demonstrated
Patersonts realization of

tl~

injustice of equal sufrra09.

Al-

though foreign Countries dealt with all Uations as equals, they
would not allow a minority of their people to dominate a majority.
He repeated his example of the proportionate representation of'
Counties.

The States should have proportional representation in

Congress, just as Counties have proportional representation within a State. ll
Madison belittled the fear of some that larger states might
unite; for such a union, oommon grounds were necessary, suoh as
similar

OI'OPS

and similar ou.stoms.

The larger States, aooording

to h1s oalculations, had none of these.

They dif'fered in manners,

religions, orops, and other oircumstances necessary for unity.
For example, he reminded them that the staple of Massachusetts
was fish, that of Pennsylvania,

rlour~,

that of' Virginia, tobacoo •

•
Mere equality in size could not surmount inequality of l'esouroes.
He used an historioal example.

ously powerful.
Punio Wars. l2

G9.I'thage and Rome WE):re simultane-

Instead of' concord, they were ravaged by the

It seemed to !1tadison tP..s.t two extremes .faoed the Deputies;

either perfect separation or oomplete inoorporation of the States.
In the first oase, they 'WOuld be independent states, subjeot only

12

111b1d•
Ib1d •

290-294.

r
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to the law of Nations.

In the latter case, the States in

would approximate Counties in a state.

tit

Iiation

!f t;:ta small statos ware

wise, he said, they \\Ould seek safety in a government, wl1.ereby all
the states, large and small, would assooiate as Counties within a
state. 13
He rem.inded the small states of the danger of government,
whereby all the states would live in equality.

He warned them of

dangers to 81'l1all States if' the general government were too feeble.
In suoh a ease, the large states would distrust the government,
and "ould be tempted to take ati'airs into their own bands.
131:18.11

If the

States supported a strong government. some day partition of

the large states might take plaoe. 14
James Wilson added that those who advooated equality of large

and small states were advooating the sarns expedient which perpetuated the "rotten borroughs. tt

He thought the bes t way to protect

the oitizens o£ a small state was to allow proportional representation.
Roger Sherman insisted tl1.8.t the issue touched the rlgb.ts of

men.

The best way to proteot the citizens was to allow equal rep-

resentation, even if' the larger states were forced to sacrif'ice
what they oonsidered the 11" right to a larger vote .15

293-294.
294-295.

Vll1EH1

a vote

r
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was taken, the motion to perpetuate the aye tem under the Articles
was rejeoted six to four. 16
Although as explained above, a compromise committee drew up a
plan to settle the issue of representation, Madison was never
wholly reoonoiled to the compromise which allowed equal suffrage
in the Upper House.

V1ben Charles Pinoltney moved, on July

14,

that

instead of equality or voting power, the states be represented in

the Upper House aocording
the mot ion. 17

tiO

population, J;htdison hastily seconded

He voioed apprehension that if the proper founda-

tion of government was destroyed by substituting equality in plaoe
of proportional representation, no proper super-structure could be

If the

raised.

s1~11

States wanted a government strong enough to

regula te the large states, they were mistaken in their means. 18
The Artic.les, said Madison, had fettered. the oentral author-

ity so that it was inoapable of controlling the nation.

As rep-

resentation was a 8ubsti tll.te far meetings of the people I the representatives should have voting power in proportion to their constituents.

If the alleged distinction tha:b the government was

partly National, partly Federal, was correct, he was willing to
acoede to it.

If the government was National alone, he was uu-

303.
l7 Ibid

_e

376-377.

l8 Ibid•

379-381.

-
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willing to allow anything but Covernment of' the people. 19

In all

cases where the government a.cts on the people, he insisted that
the people be represented by proportional votes.

In cases where

the government acts on the States, let the States have an equal

vote.

He said that if there was ground for compromise, this was

the place, but he thought there was no real room :ror compromise. 20

Madison thought that the people of large States, if unable to
obtain adequate power through proportional :representation, would
obstruct the govarnmen·t until they were able to exercise their due
influence.

Even the existing Confederacy allowed extra in:fluence

by larger states.

Nowhere at that time, in or out of Congress,

did Delaware rival Virginia.

I.f the latter supplied ten times the

money Delaware supplied, she deserved ten times the number of representatives or Delaware. 21
He then Gm;unerated the objectiontJ agatns t equa.lity of" voting

power 1n the Senate, evan if
lowed in the Lower House.

proport10n~l

•

representation were al-

He contended that e. majol"lty could neg-

ative the will of the majority; that they could extort measures by

making suoh measures a condi tion of their cooperation.,

'l'bey could

.force measures on a majority through their influenoe in the Senate
The evil, he thought, would increase with every state admitted.

60
Furthermore, the perpetuity it would give rlorthern preponderance
was to hinl a sellious consideration. 22

M,adlson then made an acute observation that would be verified
in the .future.

"It seemed now .... that the real di.ff'erence of' 1n-

tel'ests lay, not between the la:rge and small, but between the HOll....
thern and Southelln States.

The :tnsti tution of slavery and its

consequences formed the line of dis crimination. n

23

It was tllue

that even 1n proportional represontation, the north would outnumber the South, but not ,in the same degree as if equal repllesentation was allowed in the Senate.
Despite Madison's efforts, and the ora tol":r of Pinckney a.nd
Wilson, the motion passed in the negat1 ve. 2!j..

The compromise sub.

n'lltted by the committee of elaven was here to stay.

Madison

clrudgingly accepted the compromise as unfair to the majority of
the people.
Thus, we see that Madison sought

to

abolish what he consider-

ed a printe weakness in the Articles, equality' of suffrage.

He de-

fended his new plan of proportional represents. tion a.s an excellent
mode or transferring power from the States to the people.

By bas-

ing suffrage on the people, the National C-overnment was to be dependent on the people.

22 Ibid •
23

-roid.

381.

The stutes were to resemble Counties with-

a, _

in a state..

If a goverttI'11Gnt VIas baaed prim'irily on the States,

then t:hat government was weak and the states were strong..

It' the

govel"'nr.1ent was based primarily on the people, then that government
was strone and independent.

Madison reminded his fallow delegates

that they were replacing a Federal Government with a 11ational one.
A Ii'sderal Goverllillent VJas dependant on the States; a stronger one ~

a Uational one, was based on the people.
Madison also argued that a lUGer State, with a large!' popu ....
lation, deserved a larger franchise.

v~t}wr

he was truly con-

cerned with the ttinjustice lJ involved, or whetr...er he used this argument to st!'ongthen his bid for governraent based on the people 1s
not claar.

It should be remembered that Madison was wholly for p!'oportional representation.

A study of his notes reveals that he op-

posed the oompromise beoause it did

~ot

allow proportional repres-

It does seem clear that he
get away trom a Congress of jealous and selfish states,

entation in both branohes.

oonstruot a Congress

or

American Congressmen.

Vlish:~d

and to

to

,
GHAPTER VI

Professor Jensen, in. his book,

~

Articlos

2£.

Coni'ederation,

dei'ends the Articles as a philosophical out-growth of the Declaration ot: Independence.1 'l11e Articles of Confederation achieved decentralization of: the states .fI"om the British Empire.

Once thia

decentralization had been achieved, there was a. need for strencr,th...
ening the central governroont.

Congress lacked suffiCient poweI" to

suppress internal rebellion, to regulate trade, and to control the
.
2
disrupt:t ve tendencies of state GOV0I"nments.
Men like !1adison,
Washington, and Hamilton I"ealized the need for a radical revision
of the AI"ticles, or tlw drafting oi' a new Constitution.
Washington, Hamilton, ;!filson, 8h8nnan,

1-;101"'1' is I

and many oth"

"

ers contI"ibuted to our American Constitution, but the man who 1ms
gone down in histoI"Y as the ltFatherf1 of this docUu"lent, is Jat'l'l0s
Madison, of Virginia.

By reason of' his \170I"k before and

durin:~~

the

Federal Convention of 1787, his forceful argmnents at the subse-

quent Virginia. Convention for ratification, and h1s cogent reason-

lJensen, Artioles, 2.39.
2 Ibid •

-

2111
'i" •
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6.3
li1ed~~y.aJ.is.t,

ing in the

Madison earned the title of "Pather" of our

Constitution.

In this study we discussed 'Madison's Doctrine of liational
Sovereignty at the Convention of

1787.

Although his work at the

Virginia Convention, and his wri tings for the

~.~_alist,

contrib-

uted to the adoption of' the Gonstltution, his work at the Philadelphia Convention won him fame for all ages as a poli tical philosopher.

In later years, his Doctrine of national Sovereignty

would evolve into a. doctrine which allowed more sovereignty to the
states. 3

Madison later changed his views because he feared the

1·
Federal Government was going too far in its centralization. L+

Al ..

though the evolution of his doctrine is not discussed here, it

should be noted that his ideas on centralization did evolve, and
that those who oite Madison as a defender of such centralization
as oocur in the nineteen Thirties, do not completely understand
tl~

evolution or his politioal

ph1loso~hy.

VIe a.ttempted to traoe Madison's Doctrine of national Sovwe1gnty as he expressed it in the

s~~er

or 1787, at Philadelphia.

Madison oonsidered the Articles of C::ont'ederation dangel'ously inadequate :for the pro6sel"Vat10n of o'L.tt' National atl:'ength and unity.

3Brant. L~65.. In the Chapter on the famous Virginia Resolution, Brant eives another reason for Madison's posthumous publication of his notes on the debates; he feared his argu..rnenta might
add to a. trend toward despotism.

4Ibid •

-

11.52-11.71.
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He lat:1.ented the dangerous weaknesses of the Articles of COnf'edertltion that threatened to destroy the Country.

So determined was he

to forge a mighty "chain of iron tt that 'WOuld bind the States tight...

ly together in corporate unity, that he arrived in Philadelphia,
early in Ylay, bofore the other delsgs. tea.
ont until Yday

It quorum was not pres ...

~

25.':>

Before enough delegates arrived to conduct business, Madison
wafted the famous Virginia Plan, a Plan of government to be pres ..
ented by Governor Randolph, which would emerge, in many respeots,
as our finished Constitution.
Throughout the confusion and friction that threatened to disrupt the gathering,

I~tadison

led the fight for National soverei;::7lty

He was opposed, i'or the most part, by members of the small state
bloc, men who feared their states' sovere:1gnty would be submerged
in an amorphous sovernment of the people.

Even to a oasual reader

of Madison's notes, it 1s apparent tha.t Madison was on his" feet
'whenever a chance pres en ted i tsel!' to advance or to seoond

SOl'1l$

motion to strengthen the National Government, and to curtail or
destroy the centrifugal tendenoy of the states.

To study all the

arguments of Madison, 'muld be to study almost evett"y word he ut-

tered at Philadelphia, that summer of 1737.

We selected what we

consider four outstanding strands of his contemplated tapestry ot
National C'rOverrunent, namely. popular eleotion ot: Pres ident and Con-

5Ke11y and Harbison •

.!t!!.

American Gonst! tutioq, 115.

,
eress, a Federal negatIve,

representation.

Fl'om these

Q

st1"ong Exeoutive. and propol'ltlonal

.t"OUl'"

we can deduoe Madisonts philoso-

phy or fYvernment that summer, and his work for a strong cent1"al
government based on the people.
Sometimes, Madison did get what he wanted.

he did not.
that he did

A t other ti:nes ~

Of the arguments he lost, it was better for poste1"lty
1008.

6 The compromise of equal representation 1n the

Senate, for exa.mple, has worked better for the Country than Mad-

ison could have dreamed in 1787.

VJhether he won or lost, his

splI'1t usually dominated. the outcome of an issue.

He feared the

interferenoe of state Legisla.tures in the National Government.

To

obviate undue state interferenoe, he proposed popular election of
the President, so that the Magistrate might be independent of the
tegislat'lrras, both state and Fe<ie1"al.

He proposed popular eleo-

tion of at least one branoh ot' the llatlonal It8g1slature to prevent
state interferenoe in the tegislati vet " . If the people were" not to
elect both branohes, then tho first whioh was elected by the peo-

ple, was to elect the seoond.

Thus, the people would oontrol the

first branoh directly, the second lndtreotly_

would

l~ve

And neither branoh

to depend on the states, or any other Agency in the

National Government.
Madison haa been ridiculed for his proposal of a Foderal negative of conflicting state laws.

%rant, 128.

Suoh oritioism ignores the faot

66
that, evon though 'the negative itself was unworkable, still Madison achieved his end with the adoption or Judicial review.

Per-

haps he did not know it at the time, but Judicia.l review as proposed in the New Jersey Plan,
law or the land. 7

n~de

the Constitution the supreme

Madison lmd proposed a nega ti ve, because he

reared, under the new Constitution, a recurrence of

tl~

same dif-

ficulties that harassed the impotent Congress under the Articles.
There was a definite weakness :tn fliadison's proposed negatIve, a
weakness that was removed by Judicial review and the "Supreme Law if

Doctrine.

Andrew I:IoLaughlin says that Madison and other defendors

of the negative were comparine the projected govern.ment with
n

mer British rule. U

1'01"-

At best, the negative 'illould have made way for

arbi trary rule by the Hational Legislature, suoh as existed even
without a negative dUl."ing the black days of re-oonstruotion.

The

negative was chosen :tor a Chapter of this study, not because it
was a canny proposal, but beoause it illustrates Madisonfs'zeal
for a strong g'Overnment.

Madison

fou~pt

for a strong Executive, elected not by state

IJGg1slatures, but by the people.

As a .fot'!oor member of Congress,

he knew first-hand the piti:f'ul attempts of fumbling Executive com-

mittees under the

Artiolos~

Although he wanted a strone, inde-

pendent President, it is not true tl1at he wanted any semblanoe of.

r,

'McLaughlin, Gonfedera tion, 206.

r
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rnonarcby.

Hor did he leave the door open for future monarohy.

He

concurred Vii th hfs fellow 01 t1zens in tIle desire to p!'event the
advent of :future despots, and forr:1od bulwarks against th:!.s danger
by h1s proposed checks on the Execut:tve.

Since for strong gov-

erru,'lOut the department tbat executes the laws must be strong, 'IJad1aon proposed a strong

l~eoutive.

And since for an independent

government tho 1f::Xecuti va cannot be dependent on parts of the whole,
but must be dependent on the people, the oitizens of' the whr..)le,
Madison proposed popular, not Legislative, election of the rJraglstrate.

He proposed and argued for proportional rEllpresentation, not
only in the IJOwer House, but in the Senate as well.

His arguments

for pl-'oport1onal representation in tlJa Lower House must have convinoed most of his fellow delegates, but the Senate was nl10tted
two members i'l?om each S ta to.

This comprorllise warded off disrup-

tion of the Convention by disgruntled

~.mall

State delegates.

L;e.d-

180n never dreamed in 1787, that futw.--e years would sOi'lletirnes find

the Senate more Nationalistic than the House of' Representatives.
Madison was an ardent Nationalist at the Convention of

1787.

With his arsrum.ents for a strong go vernm.ent , he dissipated much ignorance and convinced his fellow leaders that America needed a
Constitution s1lililar to the one he espoused.

He deserves his hon-

ored place in American history for his work at the Convention.

He

deserves the ti tle he bea.rs, that of ttFather of our Constitution. n

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.

Gornrllllger, Herwy;3.

19~J.

PRnf1ARY SOURCES

£!

Documents

American Hiato£il..

Hew York,

Yord, rJorthington .c. Journals £! ~ Continenta]. Cong.ress.
17711,-1789. \lI,Iashington, D. ':", 1905.
r:ad1son

James.

l ..
lOol~,

Letters, ~ otb&~ IVr! tings.

L~ vola .. Hew York,

, Charles C. DoCt1.Dlants Illus tra ti ve oi' tho Formation oi'
the Uniq,n of' tho Amer!can F3 tis. tes, inc'Tud:fne:1ames I1ad.isoi1's
notes on tEi' ~a tes in tY').e Federal convention; n V!aah1ngton,

'~:annill

D.

C.,

1927.

II.

~~I~COIIDAR1~

A.

:301JRCTIi;:")

BOOKS

idams, John Q. rIlle 1.1 ves of James Hadi-son and
Bu.f.falo, 19W.
,
, .'-;~:moro.ft,

.2

~ames.

Ilonroe'. ..

C'reorge. Illstor~ 2.£ ~ F'ormatlol1 of' the GOGstl tutiC::.n
1Jniteq States.
vols. l'few York, m8~

'everidge, Albert J.,
York, 1919.

~.!4!!

;~rant t

I~adlson

Irving. James
Yoz-k, 1950.

2f 1£..hu I:T&.rshall. 11· vols.

f.'ather

Bf. !b!..

;.urns, r.:dlrJard ;~. James :adison. PhilosophezHew Bl"unsvlick, 19~B.

68

Cons ti tut,ion.

.2!

2JoVJ
;Jaw

~::;ons.tJ. tution.

£!

69
OorwIn, Edward. fIle Oon.tItution
Princeton, l~.

!a!.

)lhat

l! Heans fodal.

Democracz la America.

de TocquevI11e, Alex~.
York, 194$.

'arrand, Mu.

~

Pramin5 of

!!:!.

2 vola.

Xew

I'ew Haven, 1948.

Oonatitution.

Bunt, Gaillard. ........................
Li£e of Jame, Madison.
. New York; 1902.
Jen.en, Merrill. .ta!. bti.l•• ot Co~.d.r ..tlon. MIlwaukee, 1940.
Xell,.,. Altred B. and Harbison, Winfred A.
tion.
New York, 1948.
...
Locke, John.

.2!

CivU

Gov.rnmen~,

The American OonstItu.

'.rwo :£reatiae..

New York, 1936.

Long, Breck1nridge. Geneaia ot Oonstitution ot the United state••
• ew York, 1936.
_.
. - ..
McLaughlin, Andrew O. A Oonat;ltutlonal lf1sto!:,l ot the United
State.. New York,~92'h
I .

----. the Contederation
Van Daren, Oarl.

Von Bol,t, H.

~

united Sta e..

I

I

Canstltutl~ ~d

ChIcago,

7.,

Hew York, lJ..905.

lew York, 1948 •

!he Great Rehear.al.

.........

the

the Oon,tltutl5!!.

- -

lOlltIcal HI. tort

~

the

.' .

IIarrand, Max. "Comprom1••• ot the Oon.titution, III American
Historical Aa8ociatio~ Annual i!Ror~, I (19031.. ".84.

c. ·'Jame~ YUlon in the Philadelphia Oonvention.' 7011 tical Soience Q.1!,rter11, XIX (March, 1891 h 1-20.

McLaughlin. Andrew

Obering. Willlam. F. "'An American PhUoaophJ' ot the Stat., ft,
Hl.tor,1.ca~ Bul1et1!l. XIV (J'anuary', 1936), 43-45.
C.

l!¥!.

UIPUBLISmtD MATERIALS

OonnoU,., Jeremiah. IfiJame. Willon and the Sov.r.i~t'1 of the
leo,l. in the lhiladelphla Convention ot 1787. d, Unpubl1.ahed
Master t , the.ia. W•• t Baden Oolleg., W.at Baden, 1949.

:

I

L

APPROVAL

The thesis submitted by

SHEET

Edward p. Fchlin, c;. J.

has been read and approved by three members of the Department of

History.
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies
that any necessary changes have been incorporated,
thesis is now given

final

approval

with

the fact

and that the

reference to

content,

form, and mechanical accuracy.
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of

'.

the

re~uirements

S~.'l,\'fiDate

for the degree of Master of Arts.

et.
.... Q"" U~~
Signature
ofA(l" er ~~-

